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ON WHOSE AUTHORITY?: LINGUISTS' CLAIM
OF EXPERTISE TO INTERPRET STATUTES
MARC R. POIRIER
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1995 Northwestern/Washington University Law & Linguistics
Symposium and the events that led up to it' have a troubling side. Larry
Solan's The Language of Judges2 and the Symposium appear to be helpful
exchanges of ideas. Solan's book in particular offers a thoughtful neo-Legal
Realist critique of what judges say they are doing when they interpret the
law. It shows how a linguist would explain things differently than a judge
and gently makes suggestions for judges' self-improvement.
Another group, in their review of Solan's book, seeks to "go beyond"
it.' They make a stronger claim, that linguists are experts on ordinary
language and therefore ought to be consulted before judges interpret
statutes, at least when they claim to be reading statutes as ordinary
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. Yale (1974); J.D.
Harvard (1978); LL.M. Yale (1991). 1 have benefitted from general discussions on some of these topics
with Janet Ainsworth, Ahmed Bulbulia, Dan Burk, Ed Hartnett, John Nagle, Erica Raved, Michael
Risinger, Larry Solan, Peter Tiersma and Steven Winter. I am grateful to Susan Block-Lieb, James
Boskey, Ahmed Bulbulia, David Heeb, Randy Frances Kandel, Cathy MeCauliff, John Nagle, Pierre
Schlag, Michael Selmi, Larry Solan, Steven Winter and Michael Zimmer, who offered comments on
one draft or another of this essay. Finally, I thank my research assistants, Stephen Beck and David
Heeb, for all their hard work.
1. These events include the publication of LAWRENCE G. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES
(1993); the publication of Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J.
1561 (1994) (reviewing SoLAN, supra) [Yale article]; the submission of the Yale article in galley form
to the United States Supreme Court and the parties in three pending cases, id. at 1562 n.2; the Supreme
Court's citation of the Yale article in two majority decisions and a concurrence: United States v.
Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 n. 10 (1994); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2255 (1994); Staples v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1793, 1806 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (1994); the submission of an amicus brief to the Supreme
Court in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994), on behalf of the "Law and
Linguistics Consortium", which consisted of Mr. Solan and the four authors of the Yale article; and a
panel presentation by the authors of the Yale article, Professor Frederick Schauer and one or two others
at the June, 1994 Law and Society Conference in Phoenix, Arizona. Also, I chaired a related panel,
Conflicting Accounts of Interpretation: Linguistics, Cognitive Theory, and the Legal Text, at the June,
1995 Law and Society Conference in Toronto.
2. SOLAN, supra note 1.
3. Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 1561.
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language.4 Perhaps the most extraordinary claim was made by the amicus
brief filed in the X-Citement Video case.5 I paraphrase this brief as follows:
We are a group of scientific experts authorized by our professional discipline.
We do not take a position on the effect of the Court's decision on the parties
before it. Nor do we take a position on child pornography, a broad issue in
this case. However, we care deeply about adverbial syntax, and about what
other courts have said and what this Court may say about syntax in the
course of reaching and explaining its decision here. As experts, we seek to
address the theory of interpreting statutory language that the Court will
employ and articulate in this case. On arguments concerning what knowingly
means here, insofar as they are about ordinary language and syntax, we can
speak better than anyone else.6
The brief then presents an argument as to how knowingly must be read,
assuming that the statute is an ordinary English sentence.
When the amicus brief is so paraphrased, it becomes clear that something
is at issue. The filing of this brief and other events7 reflect the classic
process of establishing a professional discourse! This essay sketches some
of the ideas and issues involved in the claims of the Law and Linguistics
Consortium and others. It focuses mostly on these linguists' claim of
interpretive authority, but also on the particular theory of language that they
offer. The question of their claim to objectivity also surfaces later in this
4. Id. at 1561, 1568. The amicus brief makes assertions of authority, both verbally and by being
filed, that is, performatively. So does the Yale article, which was also submitted to the Court. However,
the Yale article is more circumspect in its claims at some times than at others.
A major article, citing the Yale article, suggests that the Solicitor General's Office "hire some good
linguists." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 73 n.204 (1994) (citing Cunningham et al., supra note 1). See Law and Linguistics
Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 896 (1995) (statement of Eskridge). See also id. at 939 (Geis:
lawyers impute to language properties it does not have; Green: linguists have better information about
ordinary language than judges).
5. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law and Linguistics Consortium in Support of Respondents.
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (No. 93-273).
6. Id.
7. See supra notes I and 4.
8. For the locus classicus for the proposition that a scientific discipline is constructed, see
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUcTuRE OF ScmNTFic REVOLUTONS (2d ed. 1970). Much of Michel
Foucault's oeuvre is concerned with the construction of various professional disciplines and the policing
of knowledges that they entail. See, e.g., MICHiEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in PoWER/KNOWLEDOE 78-
108 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980); see also Steven Goldberg, The Central Dogmas of Law and Science, 36
J. LEoAL ED. 371, 372-75 (1986) (discussing scientific communities). The work of constructing the
subdiscipline of forensic linguistics goes on apace. Vide the appearance of a new JOURNAL OF FORENsic
LINGInSTICS and of this Symposium. Larry Solan spoke this summer to the district and appellate judges
of the Sixth Circuit about what linguistics has to offer to statutory interpretation. Also noteworthy are
the ongoing contributions of Georgia Green, Jeffrey Kaplan, Judith Levi, Roger Shuy and Peter Tiersma.
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essay. On all counts, a single inquiry sums it up: On whose terms have
these linguists been authorized?
II. DiscovERY EXPERTISE AND INTERPRETER EXPERTISE
I propose a provisional distinction although it is one I shall ultimately
have to discard as problematic because it conceals and delivers a theory of
language.9 Consider, on the one hand, what I will call discovery expertise.
Those familiar with the territory of skilled investigation can offer
discoveries of facts or of analytic tools for general use. They are like
detectives. But the story's ultimate meaning is to be pieced together by
others.'" Consider, on the other hand, interpreter expertise. Those familiar
with a language or a scientific discipline may be necessary to tell others
how to use something or what it means. Thus, the establishment of
interpreter expertise requires the interposition of a professional group
which is shown to be indispensable to those outside the specialized
community." It is a claim of power and, if successful, permits an exercise
of power. Thus, discovery expertise involves only analytic tools, while
interpreter expertise also involves an explicit claim to a social position.
One would do well to distinguish further two types of interpreter
expertise. The stronger type claims to be a formal legal expertise in the
evidentiary sense: X is qualified to testify. The second does not claim
formal legal expertise, but nevertheless attains persuasive authority because
of who the speaker is, in addition to what the speaker is saying. It is not
always clear what kind of claim is being made for linguistic science as an
9. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
10. In adjudication, judges decide legal matters and the trier of fact decides factual matters. For
treatments of the interpretation of facts and evidence as the piecing together of stories, see Philip N.
Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences Upon a Defendant's Closing Argument to a Jury,
18 VT. L. REv. 721 (1994); Kim L. Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation: Questions of Law
and Questions of Fact, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 42 (1990); Kim L. Scheppele, Manners of Imagining the
Real, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 995 (1994). Cf Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18
CRITICAL INQUIRY 1 (1991) (arguing that narrative is essential to cognitive processes); Richard K.
Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV.
39 (1994) (discussing a problematic tension between law's demand for truth and the demands of
familiar narrative structures).
11. This process applies to claims of native language ability as well as of scientific authority. The
claims of interpretive authority here are about linguistic science. See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra
note 2, at 1568; Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 898-901 (general discussion of
scientificity of linguistics); Id. at 914-16 (Levi: linguistics as science). Georgia Green also stresses the
scientific status of linguistic analysis as the basis of its authority, and complains that "legal professionals
are often unaware" of it. Georgia M. Green, Linguistic Analysis of Conversation As Evidence Regarding
the Interpretation of Speech Events, in LANGUAGE IN THE JuDICIAL PRoCEss 247, 261 (Judith N. Levi
& Anne G. Walker eds., 1990).
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adjunct to statutory interpretation.
Indeed, Professor Michael Risinger has urged me to abandon the
discovery/interpreter distinction in favor of one that is plausibly more
accurate in a central respect. Risinger would instead invoke the distinction
in the law of evidence between adjudicative facts and legislative facts.
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative
facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning
and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle
or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body. The
terminology was coined by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in his article An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process."
The linguists are not offering their views on facts in a particular case.
Rather, they are commenting on what might be classified as a kind of
legislative fact, that is, the consequences of applying particular practices of
interpretation. Thus, the linguists here are not proposing to act as formal
expert witnesses at all. 3 They seek to contribute to judges' general
appreciation of the consequences of a certain approach to legislative
factfinding.
In contrast to the evidentiary rule limiting judicial notice of adjudicative
facts, there is no federal evidentiary restriction on arguments intended to
influence judicial findings of legislative facts.'4 Nor is there any procedur-
al restriction on amicus participation, or any clear practice governing
supposedly scientific arguments in their application to legislative
factfinding. Risinger's view is thus that the filing of the amicus brief was
proper, but that its arguments should not be given any special weight as the
views of experts. 5
I have clung to the discovery/interpreter terminology nevertheless. One
way of challenging the linguists would indeed be, as Risinger suggests, to
point out the incoherence of their claim of expertise in terms of the law of
evidence. But if the linguists are ultimately accorded authority based on
12. FED. R. EVID. 201 Advisory Committee's Note (citing Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HAPV. L. REV. 364, 404-07 (1942)). The
Advisory Committee's Note also explicitly relies on Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 945 (1955) and Kenneth C. Davis, A System of Judicial Notice based on Fairness and
Convenience, in PERSPECTIvEs OF LAW: ESSAYS FOR AuSTIN ,VAKEMAN Scorr 69-95 (Roscoe Pound
et a]. eds., 1964).
13. As the term is used in FED. R. EvIm. 702 & 703.
14. FED. R. EviD. 201 Advisory Committee's Note.
15. Risinger also argues that the discovery prong of my provisional distinction is misleading
because it is, in fact, so rarely at issue. Most linguistic expert testimony is of the interpretive kind. Even
in adjudicative contexts, the expert tells the finder of fact how it ought to interpret something or other.
[VOL. 73:1025
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some nebulous kind of deference by judges impressed by linguists'
credentials, it will not help to dismantle the linguists' claim of expertise in
the adjudicative fact arena alone. The discovery/interpreter distinction
reflects the authorizing rhetoric invoked by the linguists themselves. It turns
out to be useful to explore the rhetoric of science and objectivity that
undergirds the discovery prong of the provisional distinction. And we must
also ask whether this particular kind of linguistics is the most useful kind,
a question that the discovery term keeps in view. In any event, Risinger and
I end up at the same place. As I have already put the question, on whose
terms have these linguists been authorized?
One type of interpreter expertise might rise to the strong level of formal
expert testimony about reading statutes.1 6 In Risinger's view, of course,
this would be improper. But whether in the context of argument about
legislative or adjudicative facts, arguments of linguistic expertise are self-
defeating insofar as they purport to simplify and clarify the legal process.
There is an obvious problem: the battle of the experts, and whatever its
analog might be in contests over legislative facts. Counter-experts will
emerge for any position with the least bit of flexibility in it whenever the
stakes are high enough. Moreover, the ultimate decision on contested
questions will still be made by non-linguists. And nothing prevents judges
from incorporating other factors surreptitiously in their purportedly
language-related reasoning.7
There is a broader question about interpreter expertise. Is linguistic
expertise what is called for? If so, whose? I offer an example. Once some
of my clients were considering a proposed agreement with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps). It concerned the mode of operation of
16. To the extent that formal expert testimony might ever be at issue, excluding some pseudo-
experts might be thought to address this problem. So one road from the claim of interpreter expertise
leads to consideration of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The
Court described four relevant factors for admissibility of expert testimony: falsifiability, peer review and
publication, error rate and general acceptance. Id. at 2796-97. These are to be applied flexibly. Id. at
2797. A courtroom more open to battles of the experts, including linguists, is one possible consequence
of Daubert. On the other hand, some of the Daubert factors have been used to exclude certain kinds
of "soft" expertise. Also, FED. I- EvwD. 702 governs "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge," but Daubert addresses only the "scientific" portion of this rule. 113 S. Ct. at 2795 & n.
8. One might argue that social sciences are "technical or specialized" and that testimony about them
does not trigger the Daubert test. All in all, it is too early to tell what effect Daubert will have on
forensic linguists.
17. A jury ought not to be deciding what a statute means, and Brandeis-brief like arguments would
be presented to the judge alone. I suspect that one could come up with a scenario where some vaguely
worded determination of ultimate fact gave the jury an opportunity to react to arguments about how to
read a statute.
1995] 1029
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hydroelectric turbines at a Corps dam that had been constructed to
accommodate such facilities in the future. The Clients had already become
co-licensees, based on their understanding of the original license and of
Corps documents dating back into the early 1960s.18 The language of the
license and preliminary Corps documents presented problems.
There are several possible modes of operation of a hydroelectric project.
One allows whatever water comes down the river to pass through the
turbines immediately and continue downstream. Ponding water behind a
dam can cause flooding and disrupt aquatic and riparian ecosystems. t9 Yet
ponding has its advantages. Ponding on a daily basis permits the water to
be released at the most advantageous time, typically to generate electricity
at peak demand times in afternoon and early evening.2"
The 1960 agreement stated that the project would operate on the basis
of run-of-river operation. My clients planned to operate the project with
daily ponding, causing a fluctuation in water level. Economic studies
prepared in determining whether to undertake the project were based on a
daily ponding model. Indeed, it made no sense economically to go forward
with the project in 1985 if daily ponding was not allowed.2' The Corps,
however, took the position that run-of-river meant instantaneous outflow
equals inflow.
It looked as though we might be headed for the arcana of arguments over
plain meaning and the parol evidence rule. But I did a computer search for
run-of-river and instantaneous flow in the opinions of the Federal Power
Commission (FPC), which has licensing authority over privately-owned
hydroelectric projects.' I documented a number of cases from the 1930s
18. See KAMO Electric Cooperative, Inc., 29 F.E.R.C. 62,197, at 63,285 - 86 (1984) (issuing
license, describing preexisting Corps dam and describing project as "run-of-river'). See also KAMO
Electric Cooperative, Inc., 34 F.E.R.C. 62,286 (partial transfer of license to Oklahoma Municipal
Power Authority, effective January 1, 1986). Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority became the sole
licensee in 1989. KAMO Electric Cooperative, Inc., 46 F.E.R.C. 62,286 (1989).
19. Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority, Project Nos. 3083-0252, -058, & -068, 72 F.E.R.C.
61,076, 1995 LEXIS FERC 1470, at *4-5 n.9 (July 26, 1995) (defining daily pondage).
20. There are other types of ponding. Weekly ponding permits the water to be stored and released
during weekday afternoons and not on weekends. Seasonal ponding permits the storage of water flows
in the winter and spring and greater releases during the summer and fall, when energy usage in warm
climates is highest because of air conditioning.
21. Oklahoma Municipal PowerAuthority, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,058, at 61,199-200 (1994) (describing
licensee's argument that the project's economics will become unfavorable if licensee is forced to
provide additional water releases in order to raise dissolved oxygen level in stilling pool immediately
below dam).
22. Pursuant to Part I of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791 - 823b (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The Federal Power Commission is now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
[VOL. 73:1025
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on where the FPC or another federal or state agency had used instanta-
neous flow to include daily fluctuation of water level, but not weekly or
seasonal fluctuation.' From about 1965 on, however, run-of-river was
used as a separate category from daily ponding.24 Moreover, the first use
of instantaneous in a published FPC opinion or order was in 1966, and
23. E.g., Duke Power Co. of North Carolina, 32 F.P.C. 119, 119 (1964) (refers to run-of-iver
operation with only peak releases from pondage, and consequent daily flow requirements); South
Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 29 F.P.C. 631, 654-55 & n.10 (1962) (initial decision), mod. & adopted,
29 F P.C. 624 (1963) (FPC annual reporting Form 12 defines run-of-river as permitting a few hours of
storage; project is somewhere between run-of-river and peaking, but closer to run-of-river); City of
Seattle, Wash., 26 F.P.C. 61, 100 (1961) (initial decision), mod. & adopted 26 F.P.C. 54 (1962) (stating
that either version of the Boundary project "would have to be operated as a run-of-river plant with
considerable peaking being permitted through the use of the available daily poundage [sic] at the site");
Virginia Electric Power Co., 10 F.P.C. 1, 7 (1951) (describing project as "largely a run-of-river
development with pondage suitable only for [daily] peaking purposes"); Wisconsin Public Service Corp.,
8 F.P.C. 691, 692 (1949) ("The project operates as a run-of-the-river plant except for the daily cycle
of carrying more load over the peak hours and a reduced load during off-peak hours."). Some cases
even included weekly fluctuations within the general category of run-of-river. E.g., Ice Harbor Project,
34 F.P.C. 714, 717-18 (1965) (project "essentially run-of-river," with daily and weekly drawdown);
Arizona Power Authority, 42 F.P.C. 476, 482, 503 (1962) (initial decision), dismissed 42 F.P.C. 474
(1969) (describing project as "essentially a run-of-river plant" withpondage only for daily and weekly
load variations).
24. One begins to find cases that refer to the project operation as dailyponding but that never refer
to the project as run-of-river. E.g. Dan River Mills, Inc., 44 F.P.C. 1287, 1289 (1970) [hereinafter Dan
River Mills, Project No. 2625] (describing operation as for daily pondage, with no mention of run-of-
river in the order); Dan River Mills, Inc., 44 F.P.C. 1265, 1269 (1970) [hereinafter Dan River Mills,
Project No. 2626] (same); Georgia Power Co., 37 F.P.C. 620, 622 (1967) (describing project as
operating on a daily regulating basis; no mention in order of run-of-river); Lake Superior District Power
Co, 34 F.P.C. 862, 862 (1965) (stating that project operation would involve daily pond fluctuations;
no mention of run-of-river in the order). But see City of Vanceburg, Ky., 55 F.P.C. 1432, 1439, 1446
(1976) (describing project as run-of-river, but providing in Article 47 of the license for compliance with
Corps limitations on fluctuations); City of Vanceburg, Ky., 55 F.P.C. 1460, 1469, 1487 (1976) (same);
Dan River, Inc, 51 F.P.C. 1861, 1862 (1974) (describing the same projects addressed in the two Dan
River Mills orders as run-of-river and hav[ing] only small amounts of pondage); Alabama Water
Improvement Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 48 F.P.C. 270, 276 (1971), remanded, 48 F.P.C. 258 (1972)
(initial decision describing Holt project as run-of-river but permitted to fluctuate by up to one foot
daily). So the new distinction did not penetrate completely.
Indeed, in the recent series of orders concerning the project my clients eventually constructed and
now operate, the terminology remains somewhat inconsistent. The project is most often referred to as
operating in a daily ponding mode. Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority, 72 F.E.R.C. 61,076, 1995
LEXIS FERC at *4; Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority, 68 F.E.R.C. 61,058, at 61,197 (describing
project as "run-of-river with provisions for daily pondage'); Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority, 66
F E.R.C. 62,033 at 64,130 n. 3 (1994); Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority, 51 F.E.R.C. 62,321
at 63,567(1990). But in one opinion the project is referred to as a run-of-river project. KAMO Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 29 F.E.RtC. 62,197, at 63,286 (run-of-river, note that this order was issued prior
to reaching agreement with the Corps and commencement of construction - the FERC may not have
focused on the distinction). One of the daily ponding opinions also calls the project run-of-river.
Oklahoma Municipal Power Authority, 68 F.E.R.C. at 61,197.
1995] 1031
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other government agencies, in their comments on hydro projects, began
using instanteneous about the same time.' There was a linguistic shift. In
1960 or so my clients and the Corps would have meant to agree on what
my clients now needed. I wrote up the history of the reading of run-of-
river, daily ponding and instantaneous flow and sent it off to the clients.26
I am not a linguist. My undergraduate major at Yale was in literature and
literary theory. My basic training for the run-of-river memorandum was
most likely a paper I wrote for a course on Dante's Divina Commedia, in
which I examined every use of arrow or target imagery in the poem. Thus
it is not necessarily what linguists have to offer that is most useful to a
particular problem of legal interpretation." Other disciplines of close
textual reading and exegesis-among them, literature, history, religious
studies, law, and some kinds of philosophy and psychotherapy-might turn
out to be just what is called for, rather than a linguistics Ph.D.28 Even if
it is linguistics that is called for, whose version?
My clients and the Corps understood and applied the linguistic argument,
once I developed it, without help from either a linguist or a judge. The
Corps gave in and agreed to my client's terms. If interpreter expertise were
at stake, someone would have had to tell them what the information I had
25. The first use of instantaneous in a published FPC hydro opinion is in Virginia Electric Power
Co., 37 F.P.C. 353, 368 (1966), rev. on other grounds, 37 F.P.C. 340 (1967) (initial decision)
(describing testimony of Department of the Interior witness). Other early orders include Niagara
Mohawk Power Ohio River Power Co., 50 F.P.C. 2020, 2023 (1973) (Department of the Interior in
1969 sought instantaneous flows as a license condition); Dan River Mills, Inc., Project No. 2625, 44
F.P.C. at 1289 (1970) (Department of the Interior recommended a "minimum instantaneous flow"
requirement; its letter was probably written in 1967 or so, as the license application was filed in
October, 1966); Dan River Mills, Inc., Project No. 2626, 44 F.P.C. at 1287 (same); Bangor Hydro-
Electric Co., 43 F.P.C. 132, 133 (1970) (referring to recommendation by the Department of the Interior,
upon the recommendations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and the Maine Air
and Water Improvement Commission, of "minimum instantaneous seasonal flows"; license application
filed in 1966, so comments probably from 1967 or 1968).
In some instances instantaneous was essentially equated with run-of-river. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 57 F.P.C. 817, 821-22 (1977) (New York Department of Environmental Conservation requested
a flow requirement; FPC deemed an instantaneous flow requirement unnecessary because the project
was operated as a run-of-river project).
26. Although I did not tell the client, I suspect that the refinement of customary categories from
1965 on was brought about by social factors, not random semantic drift: namely, the fledgling
environmental movement. The key early victory of the environmental movement, Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966), concerned the environmental and aesthetic effects of a proposed hydroelectric project.
27. See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 249, 263 (discussing use of non-linguist experts).
28. I am not sure, therefore, why the proposal for a review of jury instructions by non-law,'yers
requires linguists, rather than those with other professional formations or just good skills with
complicated language and ideas. But see Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 967.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/11
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developed meant. But once it was presented, they were perfectly capable
of evaluating it. As Georgia Green says, "The average person can easily
follow a well-organized discussion of the principles for [linguistic] analysis
but does not come to a trial equipped with the framework or vocabulary for
consciously identifying the relevant."29 In short, the more plausible claims
of usefulness of linguistic science purport to be discovery expertise. If so,
the person articulating the explanation should be able to remain anony-
mous. Authority would rest on the apparent usefulness of the argument
tools themselves.
III. SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH DISCOVERY EXPERTISE: COMMUNITY,
AUTHORITY AND IDENTITY
During the law and linguistics panel discussion at the 1994 Law and
Society Conference," Professor Jeffrey Kaplan tried a linguistic experi-
ment. He sought to reproduce the ordinary language argument about
knowingly from the X-Citement Video amicus brief. He depicted a
"sentence" with knowingly in front of a series of parallel clauses (a) ..., (b)
... with an -if- clause at the end. Asking those members of the audience
with legal training to suspend their specialized language knowledge, he
argued that it was inevitable, as a matter of ordinary English, that
knowingly would not modify the succeeding if clause. Only about half the
audience of forty or so agreed. Kaplan was puzzled?
I was in that audience and did not raise my hand. My problem was that,
as someone with years of legal training and practical experience, I simply
could not look at knowingly in what was obviously a statutory context and
read it as ordinary English. For a lawyer with any experience, knowingly
in a statute does not operate as standard English does. As a lawyer, I knew
that the appearance of knowingly in a context I was unfamiliar with should
send me scurrying to cases and treatises. I needed to know how it had been
treated in that particular area. Issues of intent and responsibility, implicated
semantically in various statutes and situations, are too central and too
convoluted for there to be a consistent syntactic usage in heterogenous
29. Green, supra note 11, at 273. Accord Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 1569; Law and
Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 869-70 (Levi).
30 See supra note I.
31. And he still is. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 812-13 (Kaplan). I am relying
on a year-old memory and failed to take notes, so I may have confused the details of Kaplan's
experiment. What is clear is that the audience failed to behave as Kaplan thought they should as native
speakers of English.
1995] 1033
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situations over any period of time.32 Ordinary language and adverbial
syntax are the wrong places to start.33
Professor Kaplan apparently assumed that when a legal text purports to
be in or about ordinary language, it is. The statement that a particular
instance of statutory language is ordinary or that there is a plain meaning
is in fact itself part of a specialized practice of legal interpretation that has
a history and functions of its own. 4 When judges say plain meaning, they
may not mean plain meaning in a sense that linguists would recoguize as
ordinary language.35 If not, the linguists' explanation to judges about the
plain meaning practices of judges is naive.36 Moreover, as the knowingly
discussion shows, legal usage is not uniform. Legal language practice
involves a group of related frames, rather than a single frame. Finally, a
qualification that purports to restrict the linguists' assertions to ordinary
language does not resolve the situation. There is always the possibility that
the judge or other authorized legal interpreter will use the linguists'
ordinary language analysis inappropriately anyway.37
32. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 464 (1994), makes this practice explicit. He rejects "[the) most natural grammatical reading"
of the statute because of "anomalies that result from this construction" and some presumptions of
criminal and constitutional interpretation. Id. at 467. Symposium participants differed over whether this
phenomenon is best described as a legal linguistic subcommunity, or as a community that shares non-
linguistic interpretive practices. See, e.g., Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 884-89
(Moore: some techniques of construing statutes involve textual meaning, some involve interpretation);
id. at 969-70 (Greenawalt: is the problem a different language theory for lawyers or trumping of
language by other legal concerns?).
33. Accord id. at 901-02, 903, 916-18 (Greenawalt). I have run the knowingly issue by several law
students. They respond by referring to Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 (1962). Our first year curriculum drums it into them that there are special rules for construing
state of mind words in criminal statutes, and that they should beware. For the confusion of knowingly
constructions in environmental statutes, see United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993),
mod. & reh. denied, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995). Bankruptcy,
UCC and tax practices may have yet other knowingly traditions.
34. See, e.g., Richard L Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995) (providing a
number of possible non-textual explanations for the Supreme Court's shift towards finding plain
meaning most of the time when applying the interpretive framework of Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
35. Although the Yale article does discuss different usages of plain meaning, it does not ultimately
seem to make much difference. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1563-66.
36. It does share with many variants of textualism a wistful aspiration to the objective text as
constraint.
37. If discovery expertise alone were at issue, for example, the Supreme Court would simply have
used the proffered linguistic analysis without attribution, as it did much other argument from various
briefs. Instead, it cited to the Yale article explicitly, treating the article's authority as interpreter
expertise (who said it) rather than discovery expertise (what was said). Two can play at this game. The
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The problem of whose linguistic community is operative could also be
described as an aporia-a difficulty arising from an awareness of
incompatible views, an impasse providing no way out. Linguists, once they
have dropped claims to interpreter expertise, are studying and talking about
ordinary language. So when they offer their explanations for use within the
community, are they talking in ordinary language-in which case why and
how did they get to talk so much in the first place? Or are they talking in
authorized expert language, even if not as formal testifying experts-in
which case, what is the conversation with non-specialists really about and,
insofar as the concern about power in professionalized discourse reemerges,
who authorized it?3
The linguists explore (and exploit) a preexisting aporia in language
jurisprudence. Are statutes in ordinary language or not?3 9 If so, then many
interpretations ought to be equally valid. Yet a judge interprets differently,
in an authoritative way. Even so, the judge may claim merely to be reading
the text.40
This apparent contradiction is fundamental to the operation of our legal
system. Political and institutional concerns depend on statutory language
being both ordinary and specialized at the same time. Let us consider this
aporia from the point of view of the generation and reproduction of power
or knowledge, a Foucauldian perspective. The ordinary language speaker
is governed by legal texts. On the one hand, these texts are supposed to be
accessible and to mean something. This supposition of accessibility is
essential to the notion of responsibility, both as to the individual's
first footnote in the X-Citement Video amicus brief pointed out that the Yale article, with a similar
methodology and authors, had already been cited twice by the Court. On the potential for misappropria-
tion of the author's authority, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-
MEMORY, PRACTICE 113-38 (Donald Bouchard ed., 1977).
38. Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279 (1992)
(distinguishing "intentional misreading" and "reauthoring" from textual interpretation, at least as to
"sacred texts" such as the Constitution). See also Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and
Reason. A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 557-71 (1985)
(companng reading a Constitutional text and a sacred text). Neither Campos nor Perry discusses who
will perform these alternative authorized interpretations. See Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 661 (1985).
39. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 891-92 (Cunningham: legal interpreters
interpret in a legal sense but are viewed by the rest of the populace as interpreting in an ordinary
language sense).
40. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 200-201 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (basing position on retroactive force of decision on position that courts do not create law
but declare what the law already is); Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 879-81 (Schauer:
legal opinions are deliberately written in the language of discovery and inevitability, of what is already
in the text).
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awareness of her/his duties and as to the presupposition that individual
rational decisionmakers decide whether or not to break the law. On the
other hand, we cannot tolerate the multiple and conflicting interpretations
that would be generated if we took literally the ideal of accessibility of the
legal text on equal terms to every individual. Discipline and enforced
coherence in reading legal texts are required. So the ordinary person is
excluded from positions that can declare interpretations based on the legal
authoritative text, and a specialized interpretive discipline is created."'
Within their own ranks, authorized interpreters-judges, and the linguists
and law professors who aspire to that position 42 -maintain consistency,
predictability, and so on, through the discipline of their specialized
linguistic practice.43 At the same time, they invoke the accessibility of the
text as ordinary language to legitimate their exercise of power within the
larger community.'
41. On the force of authority inherent in legal interpretation, see Noam Chomsky & Michel
Foucault, Human Nature: Justice Versus Power, in REFLEXIVE NVATER: THE BASIC CONCERNS OF
MANKIND 133, 170-72 (Fons Elders ed., 1974) (moderated debate between Noam Chomsky and Michel
Foucault); Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Robert M. Cover,
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the
Word, 95 YALE L.. 1601 (1986); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of
Authority", 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990). Actually, this statement
overgeneralizes. At some times and places, for some people, informal community interpretation trumps
official law. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISputFs (1991). Nevertheless, it is emphatically not the province and duty of ordinary persons to say
what the law is. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (Marshall, J.) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Goldberg, supra note 8, at
373 (discussing how specialized training and technical vocabulary make the views of the scientific
community inaccessible to most laypeople).
42. The aspiration of some linguists is clear from this whole series of events discussed in Part I
supra. For a discussion on the aspiration of traditional legal scholars, see Pierre Schlag, Anti-
Intellectualism, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1111 (1995); Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv.
2053, 2056 (1993).
43. Legal interpretation is disciplinary in nature whether it is viewed as a specialized discourse
or as a trumping of language by other considerations. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4,
at 969-70 (Greenawalt). See Randy Frances Kandel, Foreword-Whither the Legal Whale:
Interdisciplinarity and the Socialization of Professional Identity, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 9, 14 (1993)
(discussing legal education as socialization, including training in "plain language statutory
interpretation').
44. So it is not, after all, puzzling that people continue to ascribe ordinary language interpretation
to what they would also admit is really specialized interpretation. Law and Linguistics Conference,
supra note 4, at 893-94 (Eslridge: it is puzzling). People depend on the ritualistic recitation of ordinary
language interpretation to legitimate the inevitable judicial exercise of interpretative authority, even
when they do not believe ordinary language interpretation is what is going on. Judith Levi has noted
this phenomenon in contractual language that is not understood but is nevertheless binding because it
is theoretically available. Law andLinguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 932-33 (Levi). She correctly
recognizes the ritualistic aspect of the invocation of ordinary meaning in this limited context.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/11
LINGUISTS' CLAIM OF EXPERTISE
It thus seems misguided that linguists should consult only ordinary
English language ability rather than also looking to what the specialized
community does. A footnote in the Yale article demonstrates this oversight.
In examining enterprise, the authors note that judges viewed a hypothetical
Quebec terrorist organization as an enterprise, whereas others did not.45
The authors speculate that judges were accustomed to the concept of
criminal enterprise.46 This analysis does not do justice to the data. Judges'
linguistic practices-and more generally speaking, legal linguistic
practices-are framed by various experiences, professional disciplines and
goals. They cannot be treated as ordinary English with any hope of
accuracy.47
The linguists' offer of explanations in a scientific, universal, objective
mode obscures other helpful observations about language and law. To
explore this argument requires a digression on prototype theory. Many of
the law and linguistics group did not seem to appreciate the implications
of this theory. Solan is an exception, and his contribution to this
Symposium is welcome.49 I should also note that Charles Fillmore, whose
theory of frame semantics is one of the foundations of prototype theory,
was at the Conference and is among the symposiasts.5"
Prototype theory holds, in relevant part, that human beings do not
operate cognitively with categories that have clear boundaries. Categoriza-
tions depend on central cases or models that have a number of characteris-
tics. But not every instance is prototypical. We are often presented with
cases that have some, but not all, of the prototypical elements. These cases
will produce puzzling results. Some people will perceive these instances as
clearly within the category. Others will strongly perceive that they are not.
Some will have a troubling sense of confusion. Others may be able to see
45. Cunningham et al., supra note 2, at 1605 n.180.
46. Id.
47. The counterargument is that because of the rule of lenity, criminal statutes have to be read in
ordinary English. But judges applying the statutes don't always do this, which is what the data on
enterprise show. So the linguists' argument is no longer descriptive, but normative. But if it is
normative, it loses the claim of science, and perhaps the claim of authority.
48. To be sure, Cunningham and his colleagues spend a good deal of time talking about prototype
theory in their investigation of enterprise. But when it comes time to interpret the data, they seem to
be looking for categories with hard edges and to have overlooked the possibility that data indicating
perception of a strong dichotomy does not exclude the possibility of a prototype effect. Cunningham
et al., supra note 2, at 1610-11.
49. Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the
Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1995).
50. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FreE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABOUT THE MrND 68-71 (1987) (discussion of Fillmore).
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it both ways." Also, our attempts as native speakers to define the most
important elements of the prototype may turn out not to be an accurate
reflection of our perceptions. 2
Prototype theory provides a straightforward explanation for a problem
Cunningham raised. How can Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, both sincerely
reporting their readings of a statute as English speakers, agree that the text
is plain, but differ as to what that plain meaning is?53 Answer: They have
each generated a different subset of categories and preference intensities
from the general prototype and are applying them to a non-prototypical
example. To each, their perception seems right.
Prototype theory, however, puts Green's solution to the "Hydra" problem
in jeopardy, and with it a certain type of claim of linguistic authority.
Green says, essentially, "Well, for texts with many authors, we simply can't
ask what the author intended. But fortunately, we linguists can still ask
what the addressee would understand."54 Prototype theory suggests this
approach is flawed. Describing responses to nonprototypical categories
requires one to consider a response across a group-not the response of an
individual. Also, linguists as informants will not reproduce experientially
the scattering of responses to non-prototypical categories. Only empirical
work can do this. Finally, who is this ideal addressee? To create a fictive
addressee as the object of idealized linguistic study and then claim
universality for its results is surely an imperial move. 6 Linguistics as a
51. See Solan, supra note 49; Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning,
and the Cognitive StakesforLaw, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989) (discussing and applying cognitive
theory to legal language, especially LAKori, supra note 50; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) (discussing and applying
cognitive theory to legal language, especially GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
LivE BY (1980)).
52. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 51, at 1151-56 (discussing Linda Coleman &
Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57 LANGUAGE 26 (1981) (criteria used to
identify a lie differ from criteria used to define a lie)).
53. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 852-53 (Cunningham).
54. Id. at 870-71 (Green) (paraphrased). But Green was never on very firm ground. For a
discussion on social practices involving the authority of authors, see generally FOUCAULT, supra note
28.
55. As Michel Foucault argues:
What if understanding were a complex, multiple, non-individual formation, not "subjected to
the subject.... One should then put forward this entire dimension ... and consequently replace
individuals and their "knowledge" in the development of a knowledge which at a given
moment functions according to certain rules which one can register and describe.
Foucault, supra note 32, at 149.
56. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, The Pain of Word Bondage, in THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS
146-65 (1991) (discussing situation-specific differences in the operation of law as applied to blacks and
whites, men and women).
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discipline is pointless unless there is some kind of relationship between the
object of study and a real linguistic community. This connection could be
achieved either by empirical field work or by an explicit claim of
normativity as opposed to objective science.57
Perhaps, as Solan suggests,58 another problem with prototype theory is
that, whatever its merits, it just does not fit the model that judicial
decisionmaking often requires. Neither a judge nor an attorney consulting
a linguist would be happy with an explanation of prototype-radial
categories, or fuzzy set theory, or any other approach that did not answer
certain questions with a 'yes' or 'no.' Solan ultimately suggests a
refinement of the judicial system's use of such categories. Meanwhile, I
question the ability of linguistic science of the discovery expertise type to
maintain its integrity when met with the empowered practical demands of
legal practice. Linguists will from time to time be faced with the following
choice. (1) They can explain that the categories are not clear and definite
as a matter of ordinary language practice. In such case, their expertise does
not fit the template of the practical legal question, and is therefore useless,
and runs the risk of being discarded or not consulted in the first place. (2)
Or they can disavow, as incorrect within their purportedly objective
scientific domain, approaches that do not fit the paradigm of clear
categorical boundaries that many legal matters demand. The legal process
may thus impose a categorical theory of language on supposedly disinter-
ested linguistic science.
For several of the above reasons, the treatment of dictionaries in the Yale
article is flawed. 9 It criticizes dictionaries for being out of date and not
comprehensive enough. The proposed solution is that a real live linguist
will provide a more accurate account of the meanings that is more current
and situation-specific.6° An equally important argument, and one not
made, is that we need to examine the failings of dictionaries in terms of our
expectations about the ultimate possibilities of objective, self-contained
definitions. We risk overlooking the process of the situation-specific
plasticity of language. Often there will be another kind of interpretive
contextual problem altogether--one without clear rules, or one that requires
a different experience and expertise.61 At this point, why is linguistic
57. I am indebted to Pierre Schlag for this thought.
58. Solan, supra note 49.
59. Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 1563, 1566.
60 Id.
61, See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1437,
1449-52 (1994) (arguing that dictionaries cannot provide the context necessary to do all the work of
1995] 1039
Washington University Open Scholarship
1040 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
expertise needed, as opposed to some other kind? And why this particular
kind of linguistics? There seems to be a professional stake in purporting to
improve on the dictionary rather than to question it.
Indeed, a subtle insistence on objective meaning underlies much of the
Symposium. Sometimes it is counterproductive. The participants talked at
length about the no vehicles in the park hypothetical,62 but omitted Steven
Winter's contribution.63 Winter argues that context and purpose are
fundamental to understanding language.' In this particular case, appreciat-
ing the culturally determined meaning of park is essential to frame the
issue. Historically, the general understanding ofpark varied over time along
what turns out to be a crucial dimension for interpreting a prohibition of
vehicles. Bicycles in the park would have been anathema in the mid-19th
century.65 Is the issue whether bicycles are vehicles? Or is the issue what
a park is for? In this case, park provides a semantic frame, and discussion
of a vehicle in the abstract is misleading and unhelpful.
Winter's general approach, a version of cognitive theory, is useful,
particularly because it provides a cogent theory explaining why people in
good faith differ about what terms mean. He shows that culturally
incommensurable and rigid views about land use and religion undergird the
Supreme Court's decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association.66 Similarly, my clients' trouble with the Corps of Engi-
neers67 was directly related to an unexamined linguistic shift. It was,
moreover, prompted by and ultimately understandable in terms of a
culturally contingent need to refine the category run-of-river to account for
an increased societal concern over the effect on the environment of
hydroelectric projects. Thus the wares of specific historically and culturally
contextual studies can be useful to practitioners as well as legal scholars.
A linguistic discussion of how legal texts work should not suppress or
interpreting statutes). See generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 120-126 (1989) (claiming
no set of rules can give an account of its own application; a pre-existing context and purpose are
required).
62. E.g., Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 4, at 837-75.
63. Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1881 (1991).
64. Id. at 1881-1905.
65. Id. at 1895-99.
66. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Winter, supra note 63, at 1905-19 (indicating the Court's assumption
that religion is personal and separable from uses of land and geographical features).
67. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
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devalue such investigations.6"
As it happens, the problem with the discovery metaphor in the discov-
ery/interpreter distinction is just the same masking of context by purported
objectivity. I suggested above that discovery is about tools. 69 But tools are
not objects. They are objects with potential uses.70 They are tools only
because of a context or frame within which we recognize them. Therefore,
an offer of objective linguistic tools can only take place within a context
that contains an implicit theory of language. The analysis that purports to
be independent and objective is misleading. The offer of analytic tools
tends to obscure the assertion of interpretive force that makes them tools
to begin with.
IV. CONCLUSION
A major point of this Symposium is that judges and legal philosophers,
who have to talk about language, might as well have a good theory.
Professional linguists ought to be able to help. I agree with this. But as
soon as one seeks to speak authoritatively, there are other stakes here,
namely professional expertise and identity. The incentives to take particular
positions on who is authorized to interpret and in what way often remain
unexamined. The sense of self in roles is at stake.
Where those roles depend on a theory of language as relatively
autonomous, the incentive to claim professional expertise is also mutually
reinforcing with a general desire to establish and hold onto a separate
self.7" Objective theories of language do reinforce the notion as well as
the practice of a separate, pre-existing subject, independent and uncondi-
68. There were no scholars who work in critical theory at the Symposium. Law and Linguistics
Conference, supra note 4, at 880 (Schauer); id. at 881-82 (Eskridge). One form of suppression is to
ignore and thereby silence contrary discourse altogether. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); Foucault, supra note 6; WILLIAMS,
supra note 56.
69. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 11-13 (1989) (discussing
the idea of vocabularies as tools in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson).
71. Steven L. Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1595, 1605 n.49 (1991).
In any argument about interpretation, part of what is at stake is the ontological, epistemological,
economic and social position of the subject. One argues for one's independent existence as well as the
authonty to interpret. See Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1631, 1637-47 (1990) (discussing how legal
discourse establishes the self as an independent subject).
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tioned in essential respects: the Enlightenment Man [sic]. 2 This approach
to the subject has been and ought to be called into question, even when we
are "only" talking about law and language.73 Presuppositions of self-
sustaining identity run deep in the Western tradition,74 but they are not
necessarily so. As we search for better linguistic tools, we need to
acknowledge a temptation. For reasons at once idealistic and profoundly
self-centered, law and linguistics tends to persuade by offering to describe
an obscure object of desire.76 Because of this tendency, its methods may
serve to obfuscate the exercise of power and violence in legal interpretation
and in the constitution of the social and individual self, which the law is
also about.
77
72. I include a"[sic]" here because most ofthe 17th- and 18th-century thinkers who brought about
the Enlightenment would naturally have referred to the rational subject of their theories as
"Enlightenment Man," without any notion of the 20th-century feminist view that "man" as opposed to
"human" or "person" may be exclusionary and sexist.
73. See, e.g., AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE (Dan Danielson & Karen Engel
eds., 1994); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991); Winter, supra
note 59.
74. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
(1989).
75. Not necessary epistemologically or psychologically, and not necessary to a compassionate and
well-functioning society. E.g., CHARLOTTE JOKO BECK, EVERYDAY ZEN: LOVE AND WORK (1989)
(describing lay Zen practice, often in American psychological idiom); MARK EPSTEIN, THOUriTS
WITHOUT A THINKER: PSYCHOTHERAPY FROM A BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE (1995) (comparing the
Buddhist psychology of self and selflessness, and certain modem modes of psychotherapy); Schlag,
supra note 71, at 1671; CHOoYAM TRUNOPA, SHAMBHALA: THE SACRED PATH OFTHE WARRIOR (1984)
(detailing an ethical system for harmonious society related to but not dependent on Tibetan Buddhist
teachings and practices); Winter, supra note 71.
76. I address here not only Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the
Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065 (1993), but Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory,
JACQUES LACAN, ]CRITS I (1966), insofar as I understand it, and Luis Bufiuel's wonderful film, THAT
OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE (Greenwich/Galaxy/Incine 1977). See also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENITY27-29,43-50 (1990) (discussing Lacan's theory
of the origin of the (inevitably masculine) subject).
77. E.g., AFTER IDENTITY, supra note 73; Brest, supra note 41; Cover, Foreword, supra note 41;
Delgado, supra note 68; Eskridge, supra note 68; Foucault, supra note 8; Scheppele, Manners of
Imagining the Real, supra note 10; WILLIAMS, supra note 56. Not coincidentally, these sources on the
force of law typically discuss language or storytelling in the context of categories of class, race, gender
or sexual identity. Yet ending on this note is not pessimistic or nihilistic. See, e.g., Alan Hunt, The Big
Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism, 35 McGtLL L. REV. 507 (1990); Winter, supra note 63. We can
still ask whether and how deconstruction presents opportunities, at least some of the time, to construct
provisional new visions. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcen-
dence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (1987).
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